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DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN
UNDERWRITING:
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND NEW FINDINGS
George J. Papaioannouand Adrian Gauci*

1.

INTRODUCTION

Starting in 1987 the underwriting business underwent a gradual
deregulation that eventually culminated in the passage of the Financial Services
Modernization Act in 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that
had separated commercial and investment banking operations. In this paper we
provide a review of the literature and report findings that seek to answer three
important questions. First: What is the market's assessment concerning the
benefits from the integration of commercial and investment banking activities?
We answer this by reviewing the evidence on the market's reaction to news
related to the relaxation of restrictions for commercial bank involvement in the
underwriting business. Second: What is the impact of bank entry into
underwriting on issuance costs? We answer this by reviewing the evidence on
underwriting fees and the pricing of new issues. Third: How has deregulation
affected the ownership and market structure in the underwriting of securities?
We answer this by reviewing the evidence and present findings from our
research on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
historical background on the original regulation and subsequent deregulation of
investment banking. Section 3 reviews the evidence on the market's reaction to
various developments related to deregulation. Section 4 reviews the evidence
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G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University. He wishes to thank the
competent and dedicated work of his graduate student assistants, Garegin
Gevorgyan, Luis Mendieta and Chen Ming-Wei in the collection and
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on the impact that the entry of commercial banks had on underwriting fees and
the underpricing of new issues. In section 5, we review previous evidence on
market structure and competition and in section 6 we present our findings.
Finally we conclude the paper with section 7.
2.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933,
securities firms as well as commercial banks were permitted to organize
underwriting activities with the purpose to assist corporations and other entities
to raise capital in the public markets through the issuance of securities. Along
with trading in securities and advising on mergers and acquisitions (M&As),
underwriting is part of what we call investment banking. By prohibiting
commercial banks from engaging in the trading and underwriting of corporate
securities, the 1933 Act effectively separated investment and commercial
banking. Whereas the separation benefited the securities industry by shielding
it from outside competition, it deprived commercial banks of vital business as
well as the opportunity to integrate lending with securities issuance. Along with
unfavorable developments related to declining profitability and increasing
concentration risk, the restrictions on commercial banks came to be thought as
unreasonable and unsustainable. For example, commercial banks could
underwrite general obligation municipal bonds but not revenue municipal
bonds. Or, they were not allowed to underwrite securities backed by mortgage
and other paper originated and held by the banks themselves. No less important
for the push toward deregulation was the emergence of new research which
showed that the evidence on the alleged excesses that had given cause for the
separation of the two industries was circumstantial and less compelling than
originally perceived (Benson, 1990).
An early landmark in the comeback of commercial banks into the
securities business was the Bank of America acquisition of the discount
brokerage house of Charles Schwab in 1981. This led to granting Bank Holding
Companies (BHC) the power to run brokerage business in 1983. However, the
major breakthrough came in 1987 when the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
allowed Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial banks to underwrite securities,
restricted first to municipal revenue bonds, mortgage and asset backed debt and
commercial paper (Tier I powers). This expansion of commercial bank powers
was based on section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933, which gave banks
permission to organize non-permissible activities as long as they were not the
To comply with this
principal business of the bank affiliated entity.
requirement, the FRB initially restricted the revenues generated by the newly
permitted activities of Section 20 subsidiaries to no more than 5% of total
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revenue. Consequently, only the very big banks - those with large operations in
originally permissible activities, like government and municipal general
obligation bonds - were able to expand into securities underwriting and generate
enough revenue to cover the costs of the new activities. Indeed, J. P. Morgan,
Chase, and Bankers Trust were the first to apply and receive Section 20 powers.
Over the ensuing decade, the FRB gradually relaxed its requirements, thus
making it easier for more banks to enter the underwriting business. Thus, in
1989, Section 20 subsidiaries were allowed to underwrite debt and equity (Tier
II powers). That same year the 5% revenue limit was raised to 10%, and then
again to 25% in 1996. Also in 1996, the FRB significantly reduced the strict
firewalls that were supposed to keep investment and commercial banking staff
of the same banking corporation from working together by recommending
clients across divisions and sharing information about client business. The
higher fraction of revenues enabled more and relatively smaller banks to enter
the field of underwriting and investment banking in general. The removal of
the firewalls increased efficiency in networking and lowered the information
costs incurred as part of the price discovery in the issuance process.
Eventually, after a series of forward movements and setbacks, the
Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA), signed by
President Clinton on November 14, 1999. The Act ended over sixty years of
separation of commercial banks from investment banking activities.' The new
law set up a new corporate entity: the Financial Holding Company (FHC).
Further, national banks and state chartered banks that elect not to obtain the
FHC status are permitted to engage in securities business through subsidiaries.
3.

THE MARKET'S REACTION TO COMMERCIAL BANK
ENTRY INTO UNDERWRITING

Since the changes in regulation and law that allowed commercial
banks to enter the corporate underwriting field also expanded their powers in
the securities business in general, it is difficult to isolate the specific effects of
commercial bank entry into underwriting. This is so because intermediation in
the issuance of securities through underwriting is inextricably linked to the
conduct of other operations in the securities business. To understand this we
need to look at the nature of the underwriting process.
There are five distinct services an underwriter offers the issuer:
origination, issuance risk underwriting, price discovery, placement and
aftermarket support. Origination starts with the issuer giving an investment
bank the mandate to arrange the issuance of a type of security. This requires
For a detailed account of the deregulation process, see Czymik and Klein (2004).
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extensive networking with top firm executives developed over many years
through repeated deals or other professional contacts. Underwriting as a risk
intermediation service exposes the investment banker to the possibility of
having to inventory an unsold issue if it turns out to be overpriced (i.e., to carry
an offer price above what the market is willing to bear at the time of the offer).
To minimize this risk, underwriters engage in price discovery through costly
information gathering and analysis and solicit information from groups of
investors through roadshow presentations. Market intelligence skills and close
relationships with informed and regular (mostly institutional) investors are
extremely valuable for successful price discovery and marketing of new issues.
To generate and maintain these skills and relationships investment banks
engage in secondary market operations, like trading and market making, and
order execution for institutional clients. Placing the new issue requires
extensive relationships with retail and institutional investors, usually established
through brokerage, trading and asset management operations.
Finally,
aftermarket support of the new issue entails the provision of liquidity services
(i.e., serving as a market maker) and research analysis so that investors can
acquire an interest in the new security at a lower information cost to them.
The multiplicity of services and their corresponding operations
required for the underwriting business explain why the de novo entry into
underwriting is extremely costly and difficult. Besides significant capital
allocation, these services require specialized resources in human capital and a
record of reputation, neither of which can be acquired at low cost or in a short
period of time. Therefore, it is not surprising that successful entry into
underwriting by commercial banks has been accomplished through acquisitions
of established securities firms.
3.1. Commercial Bank Benefits
The co-mingling of commercial and investment banking activities can
create value if the benefits from positive synergies and complementarities
exceed the costs of negative synergies. The trend towards the integrated
investment bank that purports to combine strength in origination with placement
capabilities seems to favor commercial banks. Their lending relationships can
generate opportunities for underwriting mandates, whereas their extensive
depositor networks can support their placement efforts. In addition, commercial
banks are favored from the access they have to private information about loan
clients. This gives commercial banks an information production cost advantage
when they engage in price discovery for new issues. Large banks can also be
better capitalized than investment banks and, thus, have greater risk bearing
capacity in the execution of underwriting and related securities deals. From a
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financial standpoint, expanding into new business can also help banks diversify
their revenue stream and benefit from risk diversification. Finally, moving into
the securities business enables banks to operate as a "one-stop shop" and
capture additional business from existing or new clients through cross-selling.
However, as we discuss below, these benefits do not come without
disadvantages. Mixing different operations can generate negative synergies.
Most critical in this case are conflicts of interest and other agency problems that
can complicate the banks' role as underwriters. Banks could also engage in
unprofitable acquisitions by paying premiums exceeding the net value created
from the purchase and operation of securities business.
Notwithstanding the perceived benefits and risks, their ultimate impact
on value needs to be assessed by examining the market's reaction. Therefore,
the following sub-section reviews the pertinent literature.
3.2. Evidence on Market Reaction: Commercial Banks
Studies on the financial consequences of corporate conglomeration
have revealed that (a) the market discounts the value of conglomerates in the
order of 15% compared to the value of single-activity firms, and (b) the
conglomerate discount declines or even disappears as the degree of relatedness
of the combined business lines increases (see for example, Berger and Ofec,
1995). More specifically, DeLong (2000) shows that in the case of commercial
bank mergers, those that increase focus in geography and activity increase
value, whereas those that do not destroy value. Therefore, the market reaction
to the potential or actual combination of commercial and investment banking
depends on whether investors expect such undertakings to derive the benefits
from combining related and complementary businesses or to suffer the costs of
decreased corporate focus.
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) present early evidence on the market's
reaction to the acquisition of a discount broker (Charles Schwab) by Bank of
America in 1981 and the subsequent FRB approval of commercial bank entry
into discount brokerage in 1983. They find no evidence that commercial banks
experienced abnormal stock returns or shifts in their risk. This is corroborated
by Davidson, Hatfield and Glascock (1994) who find no significant market
reaction to announcements of Bank Holding Company (BHC) acquisitions of
securities firms in the 1981-87 period. These findings must be interpreted with
caution because the potential for commercial bank entry into the core activities
of investment banking, (i.e., underwriting), did not fully materialize before the
approval of Section 20 affiliates in 1987.
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The next several studies cast light directly on the question of value
creation by combining commercial banking with underwriting activities.
Commercial bank stock prices reacted favorably to the establishment of Section
20 subsidiaries in 1987 (Apilado, Gallo, and Lockwood, 1993). However, the
market's reaction was mixed when the FRB expanded the underwriting powers
of banks by raising the revenue limit to 10% and permitting the underwriting of
debt and equity issues. Banks with Section 20 operations realized negative
value adjustment but large banks and those with applications for Section 20
powers realized value gains (Bhargava and Fraser, 1998). The increase of the
revenue limit to 25% and the reduction of the firewalls between security
subsidiaries and parent banks in 1996-1997 had a further beneficial effect on the
valuation of banks. Both Cyree (2000) and Czymik and Klein (2004) find
evidence of positive and significant market reaction to these developments.
Czymik and Klein (2004) also find evidence of significant value gains for banks
when in 1997 Bankers Trust (a commercial bank with Section 20 operations)
acquired Alex Brown (a fairly large investment bank). The prospect of
increased takeover activity in the underwriting industry as well as heightened
expectations about deregulation of that industry produced additional positive
market reaction upon announcement of the Travelers-Citicorp merger on April
6, 1998 (Johnston and Madura, 2000). The combination of Travelers (a
financial conglomerate controlling an insurance firm and the securities
powerhouse Salomon Brothers) with Citicorp (a commercial bank with global
operations) formed Citigroup, the first universal bank in the United States since
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
Commercial banks were found to gain positive abnormal returns again
when in 1999 the FSMA removed the walls between the two industries.
Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) find evidence of positive market reaction around
several dates preceding and including the passage of the 1999 Act. The price
gains for commercial banks are also found to increase with size and capital,
implying that bigger better capitalized firms will be able to undertake more
profitable combinations of traditional banking with investment banking
activities. Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2002) also evaluate the market
reaction of commercial bank stock prices around various dates related to the
passage of the 1999 Act. They find that commercial banks experience small,
positive, but statistically insignificant gains in price. However, excess returns
on commercial bank stocks vary directly with size and profitability. They
interpret this as evidence that positive synergies will accrue primarily to the
bigger and more profitable banks. Czymik and Klein (2004) also report
significant value gains for commercial banks at the passage of FSMA by
Congress on November 5, 1999.
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3.3. Evidence on Market Reaction: Investment Banks
The gradual and eventual removal of the barriers to entry into
securities business should also impact the performance of the investment
banking industry. Competition should increase as new institutions could now
enter the market for underwriting and other securities business. This should
then affect both the revenue and the risk of securities firms. On the benefit side,
securities firms stood to gain in two ways. First, the pool of potential acquirers
would expand to include commercial banks; hence, securities firms could
capture takeover premiums. Increased competition in the market for corporate
control could also exert discipline on securities firms to pursue value
maximizing strategies with greater consistency. Second, deregulation of the
financial services meant that securities firms could enter the field of commercial
banking and, thus, match their rival banks in whatever area the latter might have
an advantage over securities firms. If this new environment implied a potential
for value creation, then market response to these developments should be
reflected in positive price changes for the stocks of investment banks.
Several of the above reviewed studies provide evidence on this issue.
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) report that especially small securities firms
experienced value losses (i.e., negative stock price reaction) at the time of the
Bank of America acquisition of Charles Schwab in 1981. This was early
evidence of the pro-competitive effects of deregulation of the securities
industry.
Studies examining the market's assessment to commercial bank entry
into underwriting suggest that the Fed's approval of limited underwriting
business for banks did not cause any appreciable value effects for investment
banks (Bhargava and Fraser, 1998). However, these authors show that raising
the revenue limit to 10% in 1989 caused a negative market reaction for
investment banks. This implies that under the 5% limit, Section 20 subsidiaries
were sufficiently constrained from expanding at the expense of securities firms,
but this would no longer be the case after the 10% limit was allowed along with
the power to underwrite debt and equity. The proposition that investment banks
stood to benefit from the prospect of takeovers by commercial banks was
empirically validated by the positive stock price reaction realized by security
firms to the news of the Bankers Trust's acquisition of Alex Brown (Czymik
and Klein, 2004) and the Travelers-Citicorp merger in 1998 (Johnston and
Madura, 2000). Additionally, these studies find that the value gains are directly
related to the size and leverage of the securities firms in their sample, consistent
with the takeover hypothesis that larger, better established security firms and
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those more financially constrained would be the prime candidates for
acquisition.
The passage of FSMA in 1999 also caused a positive re-evaluation of
securities firms (Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins
(2002), and Czymik and Klein (2004)). The relationship of the value gains by
securities firms to various firm characteristics led to various interpretations of
the sources of these gains. Thus, Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) interpret the
negative relationship of the abnormal stock returns to capital as evidence that
better capitalized securities firms could fend off the acquisition attempts of
commercial banks. Alternatively, it could imply that investment banks with
more own capital at stake had more to lose from commercial bank competition.
Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2002) find that larger investment banks
realized greater return gains consistent with their hypothesis that large securities
firms have greater potential to expand into banking activities and reap
synergistic benefits.
However, they find that abnormal returns varied
negatively with profitability ratios. They interpret this as evidence against their
hypothesis that increased business and takeover competition would force less
profitable securities firms to improve their performance and create value.
3.4 Interpretation of the Overall Evidence
A review of the overall evidence of the market's assessment of bank
entry into investment banking reveals three distinct patterns. The establishment
of Section 20 powers generated value gains for commercial banks but had no
value effect for securities firms. Apparently, the initial underwriting powers
and the low revenue limit were not perceived to go far enough to either threaten
the securities industry or to generate appreciable gains through the takeover
mechanism. The mergers of commercial banks with investment banks in 1997
and 1998 (coming at the heels of material broadening of Section 20 powers)
signaled a strong potential for synergistic gains and takeover benefits for banks
and investment banks, respectively. Thus, both industries enjoyed positive
value gains. Finally, the passage of FSMA in 1999 solidified the market's
expectation that commercial and investment banks stood to benefit from
expanded scope of synergies and takeover gains. These expected gains more
than offset any negative gains that the pro-competitive purpose of the act might
imply for commercial and investment banks.
4.

EFFECTS ON ISSUANCE COSTS

If the entry of commercial banks in the underwriting business had procompetitive effects, we should observe supportive evidence from its effects on
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issuance costs. For example, we should observe that commercial bank
underwriting was less costly for issuers compared to investment bank
underwriting. Or we should observe that underwriting costs declined, in
general, after banks were permitted to act as underwriters.
Underwriting costs have two major components. The first is the
underwriter fees paid in the form of a gross spread, that is, the difference
between the gross proceeds from the sale of the issue to investors and the net
proceeds paid to the issuer. The second is the possible underpricing of the
issue, or the so called "money left on the table." This cost arises if the fixed
offer price of the issue turns out to be lower than the market price investors pay
in the immediate aftermarket to purchase securities from the initial buyers. This
difference, known as the implicit spread, is measured by the percentage change
from the offer price to the first day market price and is called the initial return.
If underwriters set the offer price to match their fair estimate of the expected
market price of the issue, then the long-run average underpricing should be
zero. Any underpricing or overpricing would be the result of random error.
However, the evidence shows that the majority of new issues are underpriced
and average underpricing is positive (see, for example, Ritter and Welch, 2002).
The main theoretical explanation for underpricing is the asymmetry of
information that exists about the quality of an issue.2 As the intermediary
between the issuer and the investors, the underwriter acts as certifier of the
issue's value. Underwriters do this by committing resources to learn about the
firm and by interacting with informed investors who invest regularly in new
issues. Certification power is bestowed upon underwriters because they have
reputational capital they need to protect over the long-run in order to make deals
repeatedly (Booth and Smith (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986)).
The ability to provide competitive prices in underwriting depends on
the cost efficiencies and certification power brought to bear in the issuance
process. Because the inherent underwriting risk and the placement effort are
affected by how accurately the offer price is set (with respect to the unknown
actual market price), greater underpricing can significantly lower the expected
underwriting cost, but it can inflate the cost from underpricing. Therefore, the

2

In Rock (1986), informed (usually institutional) investors learn more about the issue than

uninformed (retail) investors. Thus, they can discriminate between good (hot) and bad (cold) issues.
Consequently they manage to get greater allocations of good issues whereas uninformed investors
end up with more of the bad issues, on which they incur losses. To avoid the withdrawal of these
investors from the market, underwriters underprice all issues sufficiently so that uninformed
investors make a fair rate of return. In Benveniste and Spindt (1989), underwriters solicit private
information from informed investors in order to improve on the offer price and avoid losses. In
order to convince informed investors to share positive information, underwriters underprice new
issues and give these investors greater allocations of good issues.
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major determinant for efficient pricing of underwriting services and proper
choice of the offer price is the quality and cost of price discovery.
As lenders, commercial banks maintain close and on going
relationships with corporate clients. Therefore, they should be able to assess the
fair value of their loan clients' new issues with greater accuracy and by
incurring less cost. This advantage should enable commercial banks to execute
underwriting deals at a lower cost and provide better certification services than
their rival investment banks. This has led to the formulation of the certification
hypothesis that predicts lower underpricing for commercial bank underwritten
issues (Puri, 1999).
However, commercial banks which bring loan client issues to the
market face conflicts of interest. For example, a bank may recommend a new
issue with the purpose to direct the proceeds toward the repayment of an
outstanding loan. The incentive of the bank to do so increases with the
probability of default of the bank's loan to the client. Therefore, the bank may
conceal the true condition of the issuer and also set the offer price at a level that
fails to reflect the true quality of the issue. However, this conflict of interest
becomes apparent to rational investors who will be reluctant to buy new issues
from the commercial bank's underwriting affiliate unless the issue is
sufficiently underpriced. The conflict of interest hypothesis then predicts that
new issues underwritten by commercial bank affiliates are more underpriced
than those underwritten by investment banks (Puri, 1999).
4.1. Evidence on the Underwriter Fees and Underpricing of Debt
Offerings
The certification and conflict of interest hypotheses have been
empirically tested in several studies. Puri (1994) examines the default
performance of debt issues underwritten by commercial banks 3 and non-banks
in the pre-Glass-Steagall Act, and finds that the default rate was lower for debt
underwritten by banks. This supports the certification hypothesis. Evidence
from the recent engagement of commercial banks in underwriting business
supports this hypothesis as well. Thus, Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter
(1997) report that bonds underwritten by commercial banks were less
underpriced than issues underwritten by investment banks. This finding holds
especially for bonds of lower credit rating and when the proceeds are not used
to repay bank related debt owed by the issuer. There is no evidence of
difference in underpricing for bond issues whose proceeds were used to repay
3 We use the term commercial bank to mean a commercial bank subsidiary or affiliated securities

firm through which the bank engages in investment banking activities.
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bank loans. The Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) study finds evidence for the
pro-competitive consequences of deregulation. Specifically, the authors report
that underpricing of bond issues had declined in general following the banks'
entry into underwriting, and that the yield savings increased with bank market
share. These savings are also found to accrue mostly to the smaller debt issues.
However, the above findings pertain to bond issues underwritten before the
removal of the firewalls and the increase of the revenue limit to 25%. Rotten
and Mullineaux (2002) analyze debt issues in the period 1995-1998 and find
new evidence that contradicts previous findings. They find no significant
difference in the yield spreads (and, hence, underpricing) for debt issues
underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries. This holds even for the noninvestment grade bonds. More important is their finding that bank market share
in debt underwriting is positively related to yields, and that increases in bank
market share does not have a decreasing effect on offer yields, in general. This
is evidence of an anti-competitive effect. Prior lending relationships and use of
proceeds do not appear to have any bearing on yield spreads. This is further
evidence in favor of the certification hypothesis.
Equally mixed is the evidence on underwriter fees. The earlier study
of Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) finds that the banks' entry into
underwriting has caused underwriter fees (gross spread) to decline for
nonconvertible debt issues whether underwritten by commercial or investment
banks. The underwriter spread reduction was more pronounced among smaller
and lower rated issues. The decline in gross spreads was also directly related to
the market share captured by banks. There is no evidence, however, that
commercial banks charged lower gross spreads than the investment banks. The
analysis shows that the latter reduced their fees as banks gained market share.
The findings provide evidence for the pro-competitive effect of the
deregulation. Rotten and Mullineaux (2002) find, however, that Section 20
underwritten bond issues carry lower gross spreads than issues underwritten by
investment banks, but this holds only for issues of non-investment grade bonds
consistent with the notion that issues with greater information asymmetry
benefit the most from the more efficient price discovery of bank-related
underwriters. Using the issue proceeds to refinance bank-related debt had
insignificant impact on these spreads. Yasuda (2005) examines whether the
bank-issuer relationship affects the underwriter compensation of debt issues.
He reports that banks offer fee discounts to issuers who are their loan clients.
Since banks also provide better offer prices for the bond issues of such clients,
the implication is that banks share the savings due to these relationships with
their clients.
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4.2. Evidence on the Underwriter Fees and Underpricing of
Equity Offerings
In their study of bond issues, Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) also
report findings about the impact of bank entry into underwriting on the gross
spreads charged for equity offerings. They find no evidence of lower
underwriter fees for equity issues (IPOs) underwritten by commercial banks.
This is corroborated by Chaplinsky and Erwin (2001) who find that gross
spreads for IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have no impact on the
choice of a commercial versus an investment bank as underwriter. Fields,
Fraser and Bhargava (2003) also report insignificant differences in the gross
spreads of IPOs underwritten by Section 20 and pure investment banks.
The evidence on the underpricing of equity issues (limited to IPOs) is
rather mixed. Chaplinsky and Erwin (2001) find that initial returns (the
underpricing metric) are indistinguishable for IPOs underwritten by commercial
banks and investment banks, respectively. Utilizing a sample of IPOs
underwritten by commercial bank affiliates and investment banks in the period
1995-1998, Hebb (2002) finds that underpricing is lower for bank underwritten
IPOs only if there is a prior lending relationship that helps mitigate the price
discovery costs and increases certification power. Consistent with this notion,
the commercial bank advantage in producing lower underpricing is most
pronounced in the post-1997 period when the firewalls had been relaxed.
However, underpricing increases if the underwriter is a commercial bank and
the issue proceeds are used to retire existing debt. This is evidence that
commercial banks mitigate the market's perception of a conflict of interest by
relatively underpricing these issues more. Schenone (2004) also finds that
when bank affiliates underwrite IPOs of issuers with whom the parent bank has
prior lending relationships underpricing is reduced by 17%. Prior underwriting
relationships are much less important in reducing underpricing.
Fields, Fraser and Bhargava (2003) analyze a sample of IPOs
underwritten by commercial and investment banks in the period 1991-1997.
Their findings suggest that IPOs underwritten by commercial banks have
significantly lower total issuance cost (i.e., the sum of gross spread and
underpricing), but the cost savings come from the significantly lower
underpricing. Moreover, firms whose IPOs were brought to the market by
commercial bank affiliates realize superior long-term stock return performance
than firms with IPOs underwritten by investment banks.
The lower
underpricing and the better long-term stock performance of commercial bank

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/2

12

Papaioannou and Gauci: Deregulation and Competition in Underwriting: Review of the Evide

DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN UNDERWRITING

underwritten IPOs imply that banks use their superior inside information to
market higher quality IPOs.

4.3. Interpretation of the Overall Evidence
The above evidence suggests that deregulation of underwriting
lowered the underwriting fees on debt issues, especially those of lower quality,
but had no impact on the gross spreads for equity issues. Thus, banks were not
able or willing to translate their information superiority into lower spreads
except for debt issues of low quality. Equity issues, especially IPOs, have
sticky gross spreads, as the preponderance of the 7% fee indicates (see Chen
and Ritter, 2000), which commercial bank competition did not affect. It is
worth noting that bank entry put pressure on the relatively low gross spreads of
debt issues, but did not impact the considerably higher IPO gross spreads. This
may be due to the fact that debt underwriting is a more commodity type service
whereas IPO underwriting requires more specialized resources. More important
is the evidence that underwriting did not compel bank affiliates to underprice
Instead, the evidence suggests that
more due to conflicts of interest.
their superior information about
able
to
exploit
affiliates
were
bank
commercial
loan clients' business to produce more efficient price discovery and, thus,
reduce the underpricing of the new issues they underwrote, consistent with the
certification hypothesis. Nonetheless, this advantage dissipates when proceeds
are used to repay bank-related loans in line with the conflict of interest
hypothesis.
5.

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, COMPETITION AND
CONCENTRATION

Commercial banks can enter the underwriting market either through
internal expansion or through acquisitions. The banks' success and penetration
rate would depend, however, on whether banks find or perceive the combination
of banking and underwriting operations to be value creating. Therefore, the
record on ownership structure, market profile and overall competition can shed
light on this question. An additional question of importance is whether
deregulation has decreased concentration or whether banks, through de novo
expansion or acquisitions, have supplanted themselves as the new dominant
players of the market. There has been limited evidence on the effects of
deregulation on the ownership structure and competition of the underwriting
industry. Smith's (2004) overview of recent developments in investment
banking, including industry structure, is informative but incomplete. Some
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evidence on industry competition and concentration, usually fragmentary and
focusing mostly on IPOs, can be found in several papers that examine the
record of commercial bank affiliates in the underwriting of securities.
Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) show banks had increased their
market share of debt from 4.40% in 1991 to 16.28% in 1996, and their equity
market share from (0.37%) in 1992 to 2.15%. Chaplinsky and Erwin (2001)
conduct a more detailed analysis of market share data for equity IPOs and
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). They find that the Section 20 subsidiaries'
market share increased from 0.5% in 1992 for IPOs and 0.1% in 1991 for SEOs
to 20.6% for IPOs and 28.5% for SEOs in 2000. Despite these gains in equity
underwriting market share, Chaplinsky and Erwin find that commercial bank
acquisitions of other underwriting firms leads to a significant decline of the
combined market share. Furthermore, considering Section 20 and securities
firms that had been acquired in the 1990-2000 period together, Chaplinsky and
Erwin find that their market share of equity offerings had declined from 32.3%
in 1991 to 25.4% in 2000. On the contrary, independent investment banks had
increased their market share from 67.7% in 1991 to 74.6% in 2000. Chaplinsky
and Erwin also find that commercial bank affiliates underwrite, in general, IPOs
and SEOs of smaller issuers, with fewer issues being listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (a sign of quality).
Hansen (2001) investigates competition and ease of entry into the IPO
market in the context of the pervasiveness of the 7% gross spread for IPOs. He
finds that there is an increase of 62% in the number of different firms that enter
the IPO underwriting market in the 1990's as compared to the 1980's. Further,
he finds that seven of the 1998 top 15 underwriters are not in the 1985 top 15.
Also, more than 15 different firms had been a top five underwriter at least once
since 1985. In the post-1992 period, five large commercial banks have joined
the league table's top 15 positions. Moreover, 27 different firms ranked in the
top 15, and 11 different banks occupied a top five spot.
An interesting question is whether bank entry into underwriting has
lowered the concentration of this industry. Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999)
report that the five-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl index for debt issues
had declined, respectively, from 75.62% and 1506.38 in 1985 to 61.72% and
1175.43 in 1996. The drop in concentration was even more dramatic for lower
quality debt (Caa-Ba3 rating): from 86.40% to 47.88% for the five-firm
concentration ratio and from 3786.98 to 754.71 for the Herfindahl index over
the same period. The decline for high quality debt was much smaller. Their
findings corroborate the evidence that commercial banks have a comparative
advantage in price discovery over pure investment banks in the case of issues
with higher information production costs. Hansen (2001) estimates the
Herfindahl index for IPOs and finds that it peaked in the 1988-1991 period
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(values ranged between 1200 and 1400) but subsided to just below 1000 in the
1992-2000 period.4 A similar pattern was noted for the values of the four-firm
concentration ratio. However, both the Herfindahl index and the four-firm
concentration ratio were higher, on average, in the late 1990's than in the mid1980's. Dovlin (2005) finds similar evidence for IPOs. The four-firm
concentration ratio had increased from 38.6% in the 1980-1984 period to 55.9%
in the 1995-2000 period. Similarly, the Herfindahl index had risen from 605.5
to 980.0 over the same periods. In his study of the determinants of IPO market
share, Dunbar (2000) reports that the Herfindahl index peaked between 1091
and 1478 (signifying moderate concentration) in the years 1989-1990, but it
returned to its lower previous range of 500-900 (signifying lack of
concentration) in the 1991-1994 period. Corwin and Schultz (2005) calculate
the Herfindahl index (in percentage form) for IPOs in the 1997-2002 period and
find it to be stable at around 29.80%.
The overall evidence suggests that more firms were able to enter the
top (at least 15) rankings of the league tables, and entry into the underwriting
industry had increased in the 1990's. Although commercial banks captured and
expanded their market share (most often through acquisitions of established
investment banks) they did not appear to gain additional share as a result of the
alleged synergies. Finally, industry concentration appeared to decrease mostly
for debt offerings but not for equity issues.
6.

EVIDENCE ON OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE,
COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION

In this section we present data that show (a) changes in the ownership
and organizational form of investment banks; (b) the entry and placement rates
of pure investment banks and commercial bank affiliates in the underwriting
league tables; and (c) changes in market concentration in the underwriting of
securities. We analyze these data from 1985 to 2000, a period that starts before
the approval of Section 20 subsidiaries and ends after the passage of the FSMA
of 1999.
6.1. Evidence on Ownership Structure
We focus our analysis on the top ranked underwriters as shown in the
league tables published by the Investment Dealers' Digest (IDD). These tables
4 According to the Department of Justice, a Herfindahl index value greater than 1800 indicate high

concentration; a value between 1000 and 1800 indicates moderate concentration; and a value of less
than 1000 signifies no concentration.
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rank by dollar volume of underwriting the top 15 book-running managers for
various categories and subcategories of securities (i.e., equity, debt, IPOs, etc.).
We choose the all-encompassing category of "all domestic issues" and identify
the ranked underwriters in the years: 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. We classify
these underwriters into several groups. "Independent investment banks" are
those securities firms which are not majority-owned by another firm.
"Affiliated investment banks" are securities firms operated as separate entities,
but are majority-owned by another firm like a commercial bank, a non-bank
financial firm (including insurance companies) or an industrial firm. "Public"
are publicly held securities firms or affiliates whose parent firm is a publicly
held firm. "Private" are privately held securities firms or affiliates whose parent
firm is a privately owned firm. The annual issues of the Yearbook published by
the Securities Industry Association are the source for the ownership status of
our sample of underwriters.
Table 1 shows that of the top 14 investment banks in 1985, 11 were
independent securities firms and 3 were affiliated with other firms, none of
which were commercial banks. The number of independent securities firms
(among the top 15) had declined to 5 by 2000. Nine of the remaining securities
firms were owned by banks and one was owned by a non-bank financial firm.
This is clear evidence of the consolidation that took place as a result of the
deregulation. In most cases, the ascendancy of commercial banks (via
subsidiaries) to the top ranks had been accomplished through external
acquisition of major and sub-major pure investment banks rather than de novo.
This trend corroborates the evidence that the value gains accrued to pure
investment banks, reported in the previously cited studies, emanated from the
expectation of takeovers. Table I also shows that by 2000 none of the
underwriting firms were privately held (6 of the top 14 were private in 1985).
The last holdout was Goldman Sachs which went public in 1999. The drive to
public ownership was due to the need for more capital in order to cope with the
costs of technology, participation in shelf registration offerings and large
secondary market sales through bought deals and increased risks from trading
and other investment type activities (for example, private equity and hedge
funds). Finally, it is interesting to note that whereas none of the top 14
underwriters in 1985 were owned by a foreign firm, five of the top 15
underwriters were affiliated with foreign firms in 2000. This signifies both the
rapid pace of globalization and the need foreign institutions had to enter the
U.S. new issues market in order to establish their world-class credentials.
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Table 1
Ownership Structure and Organizational Form of Underwriting Firms
Period: 1985-2000
Status

1985

1990

1995

2000

Independent

11

6

7

5

Public

5

5

5

5

Private

6

1

1

0

Affiliated

3

9

8

10

Commercial Banks

0

3

5

9

Financial Cos. / Insurance

2

4

3

1

Industria Firms

1

2

0

0

Public

3

9

8

10

Private

0

0

0

0

With

6.2. Evidence on Competition for Rankings
Conventionally, reputation in underwriting is based on the investment
bank's place in the tombstone advertisements announcing new issues. This has
led to a stratification of underwriters into "bulge bracket," "major," "submajor," and other levels of lesser importance. The more underwriting deals an
investment bank originates as a lead manager the higher its ranking in the
league tables and, hence, the higher its status in the above hierarchical
groupings. Academic studies have found that the reputation of an underwriter
has important implications for the types of securities they underwrite, the
degree of underpricing, and the spreads they charge (see Carter and Manaster,
1999).
If indeed underwriting by commercial bank affiliates enjoys
comparative advantages over underwriting done by pure investment banks, this
should be reflected in the relative rankings of these two groups of underwriters.
We analyze the rankings in the league tables for various categories of
securities in the period 1985-2000. We divide this period into two sub-periods:
1985-1990 and 1991-2000. The first period starts before the introduction of
Section 20 subsidiaries and ends in 1990, a period during which Section 20
subsidiaries had not started yet to underwrite equity offerings. The second
period from 1991 to 2000 encompasses all the major deregulation stages,
including the passage of the FSMA in 1999. The categories of underwritten
securities we select are such that they represent underwriting activity in the
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most important and comprehensive areas of domestic and international
underwriting. The source of these data is the Investment Dealers'Digest.
We examine first how deregulation affected the rankings of the bulge
bracket investment banks. Since the late 1970's the investment banks
considered as bulge bracket firms have been: CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Salomon Brothers
(subsequently folded into Citigroup). Table 2 shows the percentage of times a
bulge bracket firm occupied the top fifteen and top six positions, respectively,
in the IDD league tables according to their underwriting volume for selected
categories of securities. With very few exceptions, the tables give the top 15
underwriters in each type of security. Therefore, if all six bulge bracket firms
occupied one of the top 15 rankings in each year, their maximum placement rate
would be 40% (i.e., 6 divided by 15). Correspondingly, if all bulge bracket
firms occupied the top six rankings, their maximum placement rate would be
100%.
The data of Table 2 show that the six bulge bracket firms achieved the
maximum top 15 placement rate of 40% in five of the ten categories in the
1985-1990 period. They were even more successful in the period of Section 20
operations, 1991-2000, when they captured the maximum placement rate of
40% in seven of the categories. Bulge bracket firms managed to increase their
average top 15 placement rate from 38.27% in the 1985-1990 period to 38.67%
in the 1991-2000 period. Similarly, bulge bracket firms increased their average
top six placement rate from 72.23% in 1985-1990 to 75.16% in 1991-2000.
The findings imply that bulge bracket firms responded resiliently and
successfully to the increased competition following the gradual and eventual
deregulation of the underwriting industry. It is interesting to note that bulge
bracket firms had also managed to increase their profile in the area of
international underwriting during the 1991-2000 period. However, the success
of the bulge bracket firms does not necessarily reflect the staying power of pure
investment banks. Two of the bulge bracket firms, CS First Boston and
Salomon Brothers (along with Shearson and Smith Barney) had become part of
Credit Suisse and Travelers (Citigroup), respectively.
Table 3 presents data that show the placement rates of commercial
bank affiliates. The ranking-based profile of these underwriters posts dramatic
improvement both with respect to placing in the top 15 as well as the top six
positions of the league tables. This is, of course, the natural result of
deregulation that allowed banks to pursue underwriting business with much
greater latitude. Thus, the average top 15 placement rate of commercial bank
affiliates rose from 12.32% in the 1985-1990 period to 36.67% in the 19912000 period. The top six placement rate increased from 8.21% in the 19851990 period to 23.18% in the 1991-2000 period. Importantly, commercial bank
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affiliates were able to raise their ranking-based profile in all ten categories of
securities in the domestic and the global market.
Table 2
Percentage of Times Bulge Bracket Investment Banks Ranked in the
Top 15 and Top 6 Positions in Underwriting
Initial &
Final Yr.

1985-2000
Top 15

1985-2000
Top 6

All Domestic Issues
Non-Convertible / Investment-Grade Debt
Non-Invesunent-Grade Debt / Junk Bonds
Mortgage-Related Debt
Common Stock
IpO
All Municipal Bonds
Global Debt andEquity

1985-2000
1985 -2000
1985-2000
1985- 2000
1985- 2000
1985- 2000
1985- 2000
1957.2000

0.400
0.388
0.400
0,400
0.400
0.396
0.333
0.400

0.885
0.760
0.917
0.667
0.729
0.625
0.677
0.593

0.400
0.367
0.400
0.400
0.400
0.389
0.356
0,400

Eurobonds
Yankee Bonds
Average

1985-2000
1987- 2000

0.325
0.390

0.365
0.881

0.383

0.74

Category Name

1

1985-1990 1985-19910 195-209
Top 15
Top 6
Top 15

1991-2000
Top 6

0.89
0.750
0.917
0.778
0.694
0.528
0.667
05875

0.400
0.400
0.400
0.400
0.400
0.400
0.320
0.400

0.883
0.767
0.917
0.600
0.750
0.683
0.683
0.900

0.325
0390

0.167
0.958

0.360
0.387

0!3
0.850

0.383

0.722

0.387

0.752

-

The columns "Initial Year" and "Final Year" indicate the first and last year data was
reported for this category in the period. Bulge bracket firms: Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Salomon Smith Barney (Citigroup), CS First Boston (CSFB), Goldman Sachs, and Leman Brothers.

Table 3
Percentage of Times Commercial Banks and Affiliates Ranked in the
Top 15 and Top 6 Positions in Underwriting
Category Name
All Domestic Issues
Non-Convertible / Investinent-Grade Debt
Non-lnvestment-Grade Debt I Junk Bonds
Mortgage-Related Debt
Common Stock
lEO
AI Municipal Bonds
Global Debt and Equity
Eurobonds
Yankee Bonds
Average

Initial &
Final Yr.
1985- 2000
1985-2000
1985 -2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1987-2000
1985-2000
1987 - 2000

1985-2000 1985-2000
Top 15
Top 6
0.238
0.267
0.292
0.246
0.163
0.167
0.204
0.343
0.558
0.329
0.28

1985-1990
Top 15

0.135
0.115
0.156
0.104
0.135
0.115
0.125
0.179
0.510
0.238
0.181

0.067
0.022
0.078
0.122
0.022
0.022
0.144
0.183
0.489
0.083
0.123

1985- 1990 1991 -2000
Top 6
Top 15
0.000
0.028
0.056
0.056
0.000
0.000
0.056
0.083
0.417
0.125
0.082

0.340
0.413
0.420
0.320
0.247
0.253
0.240
0.407
0.600
0.427
0.367

1991 - 2000
Top 6
0.217
0.167
0.217
0.133
0.217
0.183
0.567
0.217
0.567
0.283
0.237

The columns "Initial Year" and "Final Year" indicate the first and last year data was
reported for this category in the period. Firms have been included in the sample of commercial
banks and affiliates if they were part of, or controlled by, a commercial bank. This also applies to
CS First Boston and Salomon Smith Barney for the years they were affiliated with a commercial
bank.

6.3. Ease of Entry into the Top Rankings
Persistent occupation of the top ranks by the same firms can signify
either the existence of institutional barriers to entry (e.g., regulation) or firmspecific efficiencies. Both of these reasons are relevant in the case of the
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underwriting industry. Prior to the approval of Section 20 powers for
commercial banks, securities firms were shielded from outside competition.
Underwriting also requires human capital and intangible assets (like reputation
and relationships) which take time to develop. For our purposes, we want to
investigate the impact of regulation. If allowing commercial banks to enter
underwriting business increased competition, then we should observe a greater
number of different firms entering the top rankings of various classes of
security offerings.
Table 4 presents the number of all firms that served as lead managers
in the underwriting of various categories of securities and ranked in the top 15
positions of the league tables in the periods 1985-2000, 1985-1990 and 19912000. A greater number of firms signifies easier entry into the top rankings of
the underwriting business, an indication of increased competition. We observe
that in all ten categories the number of firms that managed to rank in the top 15
spots had increased, on average, by 50% in the 1991-2000 period compared to
the 1985-1990 period. Interestingly, this happened as the consolidation of the
industry intensified and, hence, the number of underwriters shrank during the
later period. The highest number of underwriters placed in the top 15 was in the
categories of IPOs, common stock and Yankee bonds. The two categories
where there was a drop in the number of firms placed in the top six spots were
"non-investment grade and junk bonds" and "mortgage-related debt." These are
exactly the types of securities where banks had a distinct advantage. We can
infer that once certain banks achieved top status, it was difficult to dislodge
them, or that consolidation was more extensive within the underwriting industry
segment that served those securities.
A related piece of evidence comes from the number of new
underwriting firms that enter the top ranks of the league tables. Table 5
presents the pertinent data for two periods: 1991-1995 and 1996-2000. We
count the new (different) firms that ranked in the top 15 or top six spots,
respectively, in these two periods using 1985-1990 as the base period. With the
exception of the international offerings, the number of new firms ranked in the
top 15 spots was greater in the 1996-2000 period than in the 1990-1995 period.
This is evidence that the U.S. domestic underwriting market became more
competitive as deregulation accelerated and finally freed banks to enter the
underwriting business. Mobility is very low, however, with respect to entry into
the top six positions. Only a few firms succeed in entering the top six spots in
the 1996- 2000 period. The only exceptions are Eurobonds and Yankee bonds.
The above evidence suggests that whereas entry into the league tables
(i.e., the top 15 spots) has become easier as a result of deregulation, there are
significant barriers to entry into the top six spots. This corroborates the
evidence, reported in Table 2, that the traditional bulge bracket firms have
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defended successfully their market share in the face of new entrants into the
underwriting industry.
Table 4
Number of Investment Banks Ranked in the Top 15 and Top 6
Positions in Underwritin _
Category Name
All Domestic Issues
Non-Convertible / Investment-Grade Debt
Non-Investment-Grade Debt / Junk Bonds
Mortgage-Related Debt
Common Stock
IPO0
All Municipal Bonds
Global Debt andEquity
Eurobonds
Yankee Bonds
Average

Initial &
Final Yr.

1985-2000
Top 15

1985-2000
Top 6

33
33
44
34
40
44
34
30
32
42
36.6

10
9
17
13
15
18
13
9
18
12
13.4

1985-2000
1985- 2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1985 -2000
1985-2000
1987-2000
1985-2000
1987-2000
1

1985-1990 1985-1990
Top 15
Top 6
22
21
27
23
21
22
24
17
25
11
21.3

8
7
14
11
11
13
9
8
12
7
10

1991-2000
Topl5
28
28
29
27
35
37
30
28
29
41
31.2

1991-2000
Top 6
9
8
10
10
12
14
11
8
15
11
10.8

The columns "Initial Year" and "Final Year" indicate the first and last year data was
reported for the category in each period. The sum of the second and third period does not equal the
number in the first period because the same investment bank is counted each time it appears in a
sub-period. In some years and security categories, the count of investment banks may be less than
15 because of non-reported data or because there were no other banks.

Table 5
Number of New Investment Banks Ranked in the Top 15 and Top 6
Positions in Underwriin
Initial &
Category Name
All Domestic Issues
Non-Convertible / Investment-Grade Debt
Non-Investment-Grade Debt / Junk Bonds
Mortgage-Related Debt
Common Stock
IPO
All Municipal Bonds
Global Debt and Equity
Eurobonds
Yankee Bonds

1991-1995 1991-1995 1996-2000 1996-2000

Final Yr.

Top 15

Top 6

Top 15

Top 6

1985 -2000
1985 - 2000
1985 - 2000
1985 -2000
1985-2000
1985-2000
1985 - 2000
1987 - 2000
1985-2000
1987-2000

4
4
8
5
6
7
5
7
4
17

1
0
1
2
2
3
2

7
8
9
6
13
15
5

1
2
2
0
2
2
2

0
5
0

6
3
14

1
1
5

6.7

1.6

8.6

1.8

Average

The columns "Initial Year" and "Final Year" indicate the first and last year data was
reported for this category in the period.

6.4. Evidence on Market Concentration
We use the four-firm concentration ratio (FCR4) to investigate the
impact of the banks' entry on the competitive structure of the new offerings
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markets. 5 Table 6 presents the average FCR4 for each category of securities in
the three periods: 1985-2000, 1985-1990, and 1991-2000. There are some
interesting patterns in the data. The concentration ratio declined for the "all
domestic issues" as well as the "global debt and equity" category. However, the
trend was not in the same direction for sub-categories of issues. For example,
the domestic debt issues (excluding municipal debt) experienced a decline in
concentration, hence an increase in competition. This is consistent with the
evidence of increased competition by banks in the market of corporate debt
underwriting. On the contrary, the concentration increased in the underwriting
of IPOs and SEOs. Concentration also rose in the underwriting market for
Eurobonds and Yankee bonds. These findings suggest that commercial bank
entry into the underwriting of equity and other specialized issues did not have
the same pro-competitive effect as their entry into debt underwriting. The
average concentration ratio for all ten categories declined only slightly from
51.7% in 1985-1990 to 48.6% in 1991-2000.
Table 6
Average Four-Firm Concentration Ratios for Categories of
Underwritten Securities
Initial &
Final Yr.

Category Name
All Domestic Issues
Non-Convertible / Investment-Grade Debt
Non-Investment-Grade Debt / Junk Bonds
Mortgage-Related Debt
Common Stock
IPO
All Municipal Bonds
Global Debt and Equity
Eurobonds
Yankee Bonds
Average

1985 - 2000
1985 - 2000
1985 -2000
1985 - 2000
1985 -2000
1985 - 2000
1985 -2000
1987-2000
1985 - 2000
1987 -2000
1

1985-2000 1985-1990 1991-2000
0.495
0.572
0.546
0.502
0.518
0.524
0.375
0.400
0.276
0.687

0.530
0.617
0.739
0.533
0.447
0.482
0.339
0.360
0.316
0.804

0.490
0.564
0.506
0.495
0.530
0.533
0.388
0.404
0.268
0.683

0.489

0.517

0.486

The columns "Initial Year" and "Final Year" indicate the first and last year data was
reported for this category in the period.

5 The four-firm concentration ratio is computed as the ratio of the sum of the gross proceeds of the
issues managed by the top four underwriters within a year to the total gross proceeds raised from all
issues for that category of securities.
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7.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The gradual deregulation of investment banking services starting in
1987 and culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 should
have serious implications for the structure and performance of the industry.
Commercial banks and securities firms would be free to deploy their resources
over a greater scope of operations and achieve potential synergies. The entry of
additional underwriters should put pressure on underwriter fees and lower
underpricing costs. As a result of these effects, we should observe changes in
ownership and market structure.
Our review of the academic evidence reveals that the market reacted
positively to the deregulation and as a result both commercial and investment
banks realized value gains. Apparently, the market's assessment was that the
benefits from synergies exceeded the negative impact of increased competition.
The weight of the evidence also points toward a downward pressure on
underwriter fees for debt offerings but not for equities. The impact of
deregulation was found to be more pronounced on the pricing of new issues.
Overall underpricing has declined for debt issues, and especially so for low
quality debt. Commercial banks are able to price debt and equity issues better
than pure investment banks when they have prior lending relationships with the
issuers and proceeds are not used to repay bank loans. These findings are
consistent with both the certification and the conflict of interest hypotheses.
However, there is also evidence that finds no appreciable differences in the
underpricing of debt issues between commercial and investment banks or an
improvement in overall underpricing as a result of the banks' entry. The
evidence will become more robust as more time will allow assessing the lasting
effects of deregulation on issuance costs.
Previous studies show that commercial banks made significant gains in
market share, especially in debt underwriting, but in most cases this was
accomplished by acquiring established securities firms. However, these
acquisitions have not generated additional synergistic market share gains in
equity underwriting. Deregulation has increased the number of players, and
mobility in and out of the top ranks has intensified - both signs of heightened
competition. Although concentration has increased in the debt market, it has
decreased in the IPO market.
Our own findings reveal that the impact of deregulation is rather
mixed. As expected, U.S. and foreign commercial banks moved in quickly to
acquire securities firms as a way to enter the underwriting business. Thus, by
2000, only a third of the top 15 underwriters were independent, pure investment
banks. None of these underwriters were a private firm anymore.
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We find the new competition has not reduced the profile of the six
bulge bracket firms. The degree with which they persist to occupy the top 15
and six positions in the league tables signifies that the climb to the top is still
extraordinarily difficult. This is testimony to the power of reputation and the
unusual skills brought to bear in retaining and managing complex networks of
issuers and investors that give top underwriters an unrivaled strength in
originating and placing new issues. Consistent with past studies, we find that
the number of firms that appear in the league tables has increased in the 1990's;
hence, deregulation has brought in new players in the industry. Mobility with
respect to the top six positions has been extremely low nonetheless.
Finally, we find that whereas concentration has decreased in debt
underwriting, it has increased in equity offerings and some international
securities, like Eurobonds and Yankee bonds. This suggests that the skills
needed for debt underwriting are more diffused than the skills needed to execute
deals in more complex types of securities.
As the overall evidence shows, commercial banks have made
significant inroads in investment banking by taking over securities firms and
capturing a good fraction of the market share. The question, then, is whether
this trend will last resulting in an organizational form that combines commercial
and investment banking activities under the same roof. It is rather too early to
tell. As the recent history of scandals has shown, there are too many conflicts
of interest in running joint capital market operations. If also the evidence on the
conglomerate discount is any guide, financial institutions may find the cost of
managing conflicts of interest and diverse services to exceed profits.
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